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Introduction
Fair Trade is an increasingly topical economic practice aimed at promoting the inclusion of marginalised farmers by means of a package of economic initiatives which include improved market access, capacity building, environmental sustainability, export services, price stabilisation, and the provision of a premium used for investment or for the development of local public goods.
1 Fair Trade is gradually joining the mainstream after having been a niche phenomenon for several years. Between 2006 and 2007, total FT sales registered increases of 127% in volume and 72% in retail value. Growth in Europe has annually averaged 50% in the past 6 years. The theoretical literature on FT has recently expanded, but it generally has difficulties in capturing the variety and multiplicity of FT characteristics with a single model (see among others LeClair, 2002; Maseland and De Vaal, 2002; Moore, 2004; Hayes, 2004 and Redfern and Sneker, 2002) . A Fair Trade product, in fact, is a bundle consisting of a physical product plus an intangible social and/or environmental content. The latter is an essential component, but it is unfortunately not an experience good (one does not learn more about the social and environmental impact of Fair Trade by buying more of the product). It is for this reason that impact studies in this field are urgently required.
In this regard, the current literature comprises some valuable case studies (Bacon 2005; Pariente 2000; Castro 2001a and b; Nelson and Galvez 2000; Ronchi 2002; Liu 2009 ) and a few econometric analyses which evaluate the impact of affiliation against the benchmark of a control group of non FT producers 1 According to IFAT (the main international organisation gathering producers and Fair Trade organizations) such criteria are: i) Creating opportunities for economically disadvantaged producers; ii) Transparency and accountability; iii) Capacity building; iv) Promoting Fair Trade; v) Payment of a fair price; vi) Gender Equity; vii) Working conditions (healthy working environment for producers). The participation of children, if any, should not adversely affect their well-being, security, educational requirements and need for play and conform with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as the law and norms in the local context); viii) The environment; ix) Trade Relations (Fair Trade Organizations trade with concern for the social, economic and environmental well-being of marginalized small producers and do not maximise profit at their expense. They maintain long-term relationships based on solidarity, trust and mutual respect that contribute to living in the same area (for a comparative overview of such studies see Ruben 2008) . Among the latter, Ronchi (2006) 2 has studied a panel of 157 mill data, finding that FT helped the affiliated Costa Rican coffee producers to increase their market power. Other empirical studies on producers" organisations in Kenya, Chile and Peru (Becchetti and Costantino 2008; ) 3 show that FT significantly affects child schooling by increasing household income and productivity, but only when household income exceeds a minimum threshold consistently with the "luxury axiom" hypothesis (Basu and Van 1998). 4 In all cases, the stereotype of an exclusive relationship between affiliated producers and the Fair Trade channel is rejected in favour of a more composite pattern of relationships. In this respect, Fair Trade is potentially an opportunity to improve access to the market, reduce vulnerability to shocks, and diversify trade channels for producers who often depend on monopolistic transportation intermediaries but nevertheless continue to sell part of their production to those intermediaries and on the local market.
the promotion and growth of Fair Trade. Whenever possible, producers are assisted with access to pre-harvest or pre-production advance payment. 2 Specifically, using a panel data set for the 157 mills operational in Costa Rica over the 26 year period between 1974 /75 and 1999 /2000 , Ronchi (2006 estimates a reduced form equation to test for the presence of market and for the presence of any "Fairtrade effect" as well as possible determinants of mark-down behavior detected in the Costa Rican market. The model is estimated in a fixed effects regression framework, also corrected by using a weighted least squares (WLS) procedure in which less weight is given to those fixed effects that are less precisely estimated. 3 evaluate the impact of fair trade (FT) affiliation on a sample of around 250 producers involved in two different FT projects. They find a significant and positive effect of affiliation years on a wide set of qualitative and quantitative indicators. In addition, with backast panel data they reconstruct farmers yearly decisions to send their children to school and find that FT-affiliation has a significant and positive effect on them when children are aged between 15 and 18. Similarly, Becchetti and Costantino (2008) find a significant and positive impact of FT-affiliation on monetary and non-monetary measures of well-being in a sample of Kenyan farmers. They do so by comparing affiliated farmers with a control group of non-affiliated ones. Methodological problems such as the relative contribution of FT-affiliation vs. cooperative membership, control sample, and selection bias are also addressed, showing that ex ante (self) selection of members of the local cooperative contributes to explaining some but not all of the results. 4 The expression "luxury axiom" originates from the following statement by Basu and Van: "A family will send the children to the labor market only if the family's income from non-child-labor sources drops very low" (Basu and Van 1998, p. 416) . The statement implies that, in such a low-income situation, avoiding child labour is a luxury that the family cannot afford.
The above-summarized theoretical and empirical FT literature suggests that the crucial hypothesis to be tested is this: does Fair Trade promote capacity building and the inclusion of farmers in international markets, as promised by its principles that play such a major role in motivating consumer purchases (Becchetti and Rosati 2007) ?
The paper seeks to answer this question. It is divided into seven sections (including the introduction and conclusions). The second section outlines the analytical framework which will guide the analysis.
The third section describes the characteristics of the Green Net Cooperative of Thai organic rice producers, which is the object of this study, while the fourth section describes the dataset. The fifth and sixth sections illustrate and comment on the descriptive and econometric findings. The seventh section puts forward an overall interpretation of the results. The final section concludes.
Analytical framework and hypothesis testing
The implementation of organic farming is difficult and time-consuming. Moreover, yields are not as high as those from conventional farming in transition periods. It is for this reason that farmers need training support when they undertake organic farming (Woranott 2009 The aim of this study is to evaluate the effect of organic farming on the incomes of Green Netaffiliated farmers, and to determine whether FT (by easing exports and promoting capacity building)
can help offset the potential negative productivity effects of transition to organic farming mentioned at the beginning of this section.
The general analytical framework consists of the following model
where Y is the target variable (per capita income from agriculture), X is a set of control variables, and
AffYears are (according to the different specifications) the number of years of either affiliation with FT (FTYears) or organic certification (OrgYears). More specifically, the null hypothesis on the significance of FT or organic certification is: H 01 : α 1 =0. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis is rejected and affiliation years have a significant impact on the target variable, net of the concurrent impact of the set of the X control variables introduced into the estimate.
The two problems in the analytical framework are endogeneity and the difficulty of disentangling FT affiliation from organic certification effects. In regard to the first problem, rejection of the null hypothesis and significance of the FT affiliation coefficient may not imply causality from FT affiliation to per capita income from agriculture. The nexus can be reversed, or a third omitted driver may affect both FT affiliation and the dependent variable, thereby causing their spurious correlation. Three alternatives are proposed to overcome this problem: i) an instrumental variable approach; ii) a propensity score evaluation and iii) restriction of the analysis to the treatment sample alone, in order to eliminate any potential heterogeneity between the treatment and control samples. Technical details on the instrumental variable approach and the related diagnostics are provided in the online Appendix (section 4) of the paper.
With regard to the second problem, separate tests are made on the organic certification and FT affiliation effects, which are often combined and observationally equivalent in FT projects. This is done by exploiting the relatively shorter FT affiliation spell with respect to the organic certification period.
In this regard, the study also contributes to the literature on the relationship between organic farming and productivity, which reports mixed findings.
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More formally, the Davidson-McKinnon (1993) approach is used to test which of the non-nested "competing models", including either organic certification or FT affiliation years, perform best.
According to this test, given the model A
and the model B
each model is estimated separately, predicted values for models A and B (Y i(A) and Y i(B) ) are generated and the following additional regressions are performed
The test shows that model 1 outperforms model 2 if α 2B ≠0 while α 2A =0, and viceversa. The explanation for this is that, if the predicted dependent variable from model B has additional explanatory power in model A (but not the reverse), FT-affiliation years capture part of the variability of the dependent variable which is not explained by organic affiliation years (while organic years do not add anything in 5 Offerman and Nieberg (2000) compare the economic performance of organic and conventional farms in different countries and find that organic farms have lower yields, higher output prices and slightly lower unit costs. Ricci et al. (2004) find that part of the reduced efficiency of organic farming is due to the difficulties and length of the conversion period. On the same lines, Oude et al. (2002) observe that it takes time to reach the optimal nutrient stock of soil and optimal nutrient supply for arable crops under organic farming. This extends the effective conversion period during which productivity slows down to 6-7 years. Kassie et al. (2008) find, on the contrary, a clear superiority of organic farming practices over chemical fertilizers in enhancing crop productivity for resource-constrained farmers cultivating land in a semi-arid Ethiopian area. the specification with FT affiliation years). In all other cases (both coefficients not significant or both coefficients significant) it is not possible to establish which of the competing models performs best.
The rationale for assuming that FT has independent effects on observed farmers, net of the organic certification impact, derives from the specific characteristics of FT.
Besides automatic inclusion in a foreign market channel and the provision of marketing services, FT helps by creating a long-term relationship with the cooperative which assists the latter in improving quality standards, and it reduces the negative impact of productivity shocks which have occurred during the history of that relationship. Organization (FLO). Green Net makes advance payments to the producer groups. The latter buy the paddy and stock it, while Green Net receives export orders for the entire year and gives instructions to the group on the quantity of rice to deliver. The milled rice is then delivered to Green Net for packaging. Green Net pays the producer group, and then exports and/or sells the rice locally.
In addition, organic farmers receive the following two benefits from Green Net: i) in accordance with FLO laws, a Fair Trade premium to be used for various social and capacity-building activities for organic farmers (i.e., scholarships, emergency funds, credit facilities, training, etc.); ii) an additional yearly Fair Trade bonus (1,280 bath per ton in 2008) for organic production (see Table 1 ). 6 Anecdotal examples relative to this point are omitted for reasons of space but are available in the online Appendix.
Green Net is therefore a second-level cooperative providing services to first-level local associations.
The second level is required for the purposes of coordinating production among local cooperatives, developing research and promotion of organic agriculture, and providing export services on a larger scale. All members of first-level associations are also members of Green Net.
To evaluate the impact of Green Net affiliation, now considered are affiliated farmers in two first-level organisations operating in two different areas of the Yasothorn province (see Figure 1) : the Bak Rua Farmer Organization (BRFO) and the Nature Care Society (NCS). More details on the characteristics of the two organisations are provided inn the online Appendix (section 2) of the paper.
The dataset
During 2008 a questionnaire was administered to 360 farmers operating in the two districts: Kud Chun and Bak Reua (Table 2) . In each district, respondents were randomly chosen from two extended lists of affiliated (members of the Green Net cooperative) and non-affiliated farmers in order to create two groups of equal number. The treatment group was randomly generated from the list of all organic Green Net farmers in the two areas selected, while the control group was randomly created from a list including all farmers living close to (within 10 kilometers from at least one of the selected) organic farmers. As will be shown in the descriptive statistics, the treatment and control samples exhibited no significant differences in terms of socio-demographic characteristics.
Cooperative membership is widespread in the area and not limited to Fair Trade-affiliated farmers.
This implies that, whilst all affiliated farmers are obviously cooperative members, also 60 percent of non-affiliated members belong to cooperatives. Controlling for this feature makes it possible to measure the specific effect of FT and/or organic certification on Green Net farmers, rather than a generic cooperative effect.
As to the kind of information collected, the questionnaire contained 75 questions concerning various measures of qualitative and quantitative well-being. 
Descriptive Findings
The treatment and control samples do not present significant differences in terms of socio-demographic characteristics (see Table A1 in the online Appendix). On average, the price paid by local cooperatives per ton is significantly higher than the price paid by other buyers (10,902 vs 10,459 baht) and, in turn, the Fair Trade price (13,941 baht) is significantly higher than the price paid by local cooperatives.
Interestingly, affiliated farmers obtain better conditions than control famers also when selling to local cooperatives (11,305 against 10,019 baht). This difference may depend on differences in bargaining power, or it may be the organic premium granted by the local market. Farmers" average income from agriculture is around 51,321 baht per year. The average income of affiliated farmers is significantly higher than that of non-affiliated farmers, both overall (60,942 against 41,646 baht) and in the two different areas. This difference is matched by a similar difference in income from agriculture per hour worked (126 against 98 baht), even though the standard deviation is large and the significance is much weaker. Almost half of farmers have a second activity (craftwork, construction, and work other sectors). Considering the sum of income earned from the first and second activity, the two main results previously mentioned are confirmed, because income from the two activities is slightly higher for affiliated (78,779 baht per year) than for non-affiliated farmers (55,174 baht per year). In both cases, the difference is significant at 5 percent. The questionnaire is omitted for reasons of space and available from the authors upon request.
An invisible, though important, component of productivity and creation of economic value is selfconsumption. As can be easily imagined, 100 percent of the rice consumed in (both treatment and control) farmers" households is self-produced and not bought on the market. Besides rice, organic FT certified producers do not buy 81 percent of the vegetables that they consume, compared with 71 percent in the case of control producers. Self-consumption shares are higher for many other products as well.
This implies that the positive differences in income from agriculture observed between affiliated and non-affiliated farmers are downward biased if the value of self consumption is not included. The advisable solution is therefore to sum the visible and the invisible income by evaluating the income from the self-consumed share of the various food products at the local market value. Obtained findings document that the total value of self-consumption is higher for affiliated farmers than for the control sample, the difference being 29,503 vs. 24,217 baht per year. When this is taken into account, the individual standard of living rises from 6.17 to 7.87 (4.69 to 6.14) dollars per day in PPP in Bak Reua (Kud Chun). As a consequence, the difference in income from agriculture between affiliated and nonaffiliated farmers is higher when self-consumption is considered, in that it stands at around 6,239 versus 5,032 baht (when self-consumption is not included) per capita per year.
Affiliated farmers appear to be relatively better off in terms of financial conditions: their savings share is around 15.5 of total income, against 11.15 for control farmers, while the total family debt to income ratio is slightly higher in the control than in the treatment sample (1.2 vs 1).
Econometric findings on the organic certification effect
The descriptive findings highlight a significant difference in the creation of economic value between the treatment and control groups (section 5.3). Now checked, therefore, is whether the finding is confirmed when controlling for concurrent factors in econometric estimates.
The controls are education, geographical location, age, sex, marital status, the number of children, years of work experience, the number of temporary employees, affiliation to a local cooperative, and land size (for variable definitions see the Variable Legend in the appendix). The significance of the agricultural income per capita gap between treatment and control farmers is supported by the first specification, where the marginal effect of one year of organic certification amounts to around 818 baht, which corresponds to approximately 2 percent of the current average income from agriculture in the control group (Table 3 , column 1). The only other variables which matter are geographical area and land size.
How to tackle endogeneity and selection bias
The relationship between affiliation years and creation of economic value is not free from endogeneity.
To tackle this problem, a good set of exogenous instruments has been selected. These are the farmer"s distance from the cooperative affiliated to Fair Trade and the number of exogenous memorable events 9 with positive or negative economic consequences declared by farmers (for event descriptions see the variable legend in the Appendix). The distance is correlated with affiliation because it is a component of the cost of transporting the product to the cooperative and of any other activity which requires faceto-face meetings at the cooperative. To check for the exogeneity of this instrument, verification is now made of whether sample farmers are "locked" in their geographical location and have not changed it since starting their agricultural activity. In the estimate shown in column 5 (Table 3) , certification years are instrumented only by farmers" distance from the cooperative, while exogenous events are introduced as additional instruments in column 6.
While it can be ruled out that the set of instruments suffers from the reverse causality problem, it is necessary to test for exogeneity of the instrumented variable conditional on the set of instruments with appropriate diagnostics (details on the tests described below are provided in section 4 of the online Appendix). Used for this purpose is the standard approach of verifying whether the residual (from a "modified specification" in which instruments replace selected endogenous regressors) has significant effects when introduced into the standard non-instrumented equation. As well known, instrumented variables are exogenous if the null of the insignificance of the added variable (residual from the "modified specification") in the standard non-instrumented equation is not rejected. To determine 8 The hypothesis of a quadratic relationship between land size and the dependent variable has been tested and rejected. The results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.
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Even cross-sectional surveys are based on memory efforts of respondents when they are asked for basic information such as last year income. Survey data maintain the same reliability if memories are extended back in whether this is true, the Wooldridge's (1995) heteroskedasticity-robust score test is computed. The test shows that the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected at 5 but not at 1 percent when only the distance from the cooperative is used as instrument (Table 3 , column 5, Endogeneity test). Being in a limit case concerning the use of OLS and IV estimates, the IV approach is nonetheless selected for the robustness check.
The results on the base estimate obtained with the above-mentioned instruments for the certification age variable show that the latter is positive but significant only at 10 percent (Table 3 , columns 5 and 6). Below, these weak results will be compared with the much better ones obtained from specifications in which organic years are replaced with FT-affiliation years and the invisible part of self-consumption in income is included.
The Sargan test (1958) on overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null in the specification in which more than one instrument is used (Table 3 , column 6).
In order to verify the quality of selected instruments, the weak-identification test is implemented and the F-statistics of instruments excluded from the first stage with the critical values tabulated by Yogo are compared (2002 and 2005) . Obtained findings document that the weak identification test identifies a bias in the magnitude of the instrumented variable coefficient (Stock-Yogo test) ). However, in order to check whether the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero also in the presence of weak instruments, the AndersonRubin (1949) test is performed. In this case, both specifications, with one and more instruments, perform relatively well (Table 3 , columns 5 and 6) rejecting the null at 5% confidence level, suggesting the past for important events in life. For a discussion on the validity of using retrospective information based on memorable events see McIntosh et al. (2007). that, even in the presence of a magnitude bias, selected instruments are robust when testing the overall significance of the instrumented variable.
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The wider problem of heterogeneity between the treatment and control samples requires further testing before the results can be considered reliable. Notwithstanding the impossibility of running a randomized experiment, it is always possible that the observed difference in performance variables between the treatment and control samples does not depend on the treatment, but rather on the ex ante characteristics which affected the decision to affiliate (implicit selection), or on explicit admission rules discriminating entrance (explicit selection).
Two additional checks to control for selection bias are performed. First, treatment and control producers are compared with a propensity score approach. When estimating the propensity score, the inclusion of variables with a positive impact on income per capita (the variables included are age, number of children, gender and geographical location) is carefully avoided. In modified specifications school years, job experience and land size are added. In all cases the difference between treatment and control sample is significant and strong (between 4,200 and 4,500 baht) (Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
Since also propensity score matching has limitations when used on variables in levels and not in first differences, an ultimate remedy against heterogeneity between treatment and control producers consists in estimating the effect of affiliation years in the subsample of affiliated producers only.
11 This is an option not available in impact studies, in which there is no graduation of the treatment, but it is available here because years of affiliation differentiate producers in terms of exposure to the program.
When the estimate is restricted to affiliated producers only, the affiliation effect is much weaker (t-stat around 1.55) and its magnitude falls to 545 baht (Details of the estimation are given in Table A2 in the online appendix, column 1). When the effect is calculated separately for the two areas, the result is 5 percent significance in the Bak Reua area, but no significance in the Kud Chun area (column 2).
Econometric findings on the FT affiliation effect
As clearly shown when describing the Green Net project, organic certification anticipates affiliation to FT, which only started in 2002. the specifications presented in Table 3 are therefore re-estimated by replacing years of organic certification with those of FT affiliation. This corresponds to rescaling the previous variables by introducing an upper bound of 6 years for all farmers with organic certification for more than 6 years.
The empirical findings from this new specification show that FT affiliation years are significant and stronger in magnitude (Table 5 ).
In the base estimate, the magnitude of the effect is larger than the organic certification effect (1,350 baht per year) and rises to 1,458 when the FT premium is introduced (Table 5 , columns 1-2). The latter corresponds to around 3.5 percent of the current average income from agriculture in the control sample.
It is significant when calculated separately in the two areas (Table 5 , columns 3-4) and remains so in the instrumental variable estimate (Table 5 , columns 5-6). The single instrument equation does not reject the null of exogeneity, while the multiple instrumented equation does so. Furthermore, when only distance from the cooperative is used as an instrument (Table 5 , column 5), the F-statistics of the excluded instrument is quite close to the 10% threshold, providing some evidence against weaknesses.
In contrast, the specification in which more than one instrument is used (Table 5 , column 6) does not perform well under the weak-instrument identification test, because the F of the excluded instrument is small enough to reject the null of weakness.
When the sample is restricted to affiliated farmers, the one-year effect magnitude is stronger and remains significant after correcting for the 2008 FT premium (Table A3 , online appendix,, columns 1-2), unlike what happens when the organic certification effect is measured (Table A3 , columns 1-2).
The FT and organic certification years are obviously highly correlated (.92). However, it is possible to test directly whether one of the two effects prevails over the other in two ways: i) by estimating the base and the restricted model with both variables and ii) by using the Davidson-McKinnon (1993) test described in section 2. The test clearly shows that the FT affiliation effect is stronger. The predicted dependent variable from the FT affiliation estimate is significant at 5 percent in the organic certification estimate (Table 6 , column 3), while this is not the case vice versa (Table 6 , column 2).
Interpretation of empirical findings
To sum up, the results presented above document that FT affiliation affects the creation of economic value more than do organic certification years. This may be partly due to the double bonus of FT (a price premium directly granted to farmers and a premium granted to the organisation to be invested for innovation and the provision of local public goods). And it may also partly depend on marketing gains generated by FT. In this regard, consider that affiliated producers sell a significantly higher share of their Jasmine rice production (83 against 72 percent of control sample producers), while there are no significant differences between the two groups in family size and in the share of self-consumed rice (100 percent for both).
Note, however, that when the estimates discussed in section 6 are repeated using total productivity or income from agriculture per worked hours, no significant effect of organic farming or FT affiliation years is found.
12
The interesting question raised by empirical findings is therefore why affiliation years increase the creation of economic value and production yield without increasing productivity per worked hours.
Estimates are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.
As well known, economic growth may derive from higher productivity or from an increase in worked Finally, consider that the three findings mentioned in this section (increase in per capita income from agricultural activity, more hours worked, and not significantly different productivity) do not conflict with a positive productivity effect of organic and FT affiliation if one assumes that i) the law of decreasing marginal productivity operates, ii) marginal costs do not change, and iii) in equilibrium, farmers choose their optimal number of worked hours in agriculture so that marginal productivity and marginal costs per worked hours are equal. If these assumptions hold, it may well be that the initial effect of FT is one of increasing productivity, and that this initial effect induces farmers to increase hours worked in agriculture up to a point at which, because of the law of decreasing marginal productivity, equilibrium is re-established. As a consequence, no significant differences in productivity are observed, but rather more hours worked and higher income from agriculture.
Conclusions
The paper has investigated the nexus between FT affiliation and farmers" income on a sample of Thai organic rice producers working for the Green Net cooperative.
The econometric findings show that any additional affiliation year has a positive and significant effect on the income from agriculture of the affiliated producers in the sample. This effect does not translate into significantly higher productivity because affiliated workers tend to work progressively more hours.
Obtained findings are robust when controlling for endogeneity and selection bias with instrumental variable estimation, propensity score evaluation, and restriction of the estimate to affiliated producers only, when considering FT (and not organic) affiliation years. These results still hold when the invisible part of self-consumed income is accounted for.
Paper"s empirical findings induce us to agree with the conclusion of a FAO working paper (Liu, 2009) which, in regard to a case study on bananas, states that the FT choice "is the one that yields the highest FOB prices and export/retail price ratio, above conventional and even organic bananas." and that " 
Fair-trade premium utilization
The premium is divided into several funds to which farmer members can apply for support (a) green manure seed (b) farmer training (c) member welfare, e.g. education of their children, natural disaster relief (a) 50% is allocated to the mill to improve its management (b) 25% is allocated to the extension works (c) 25% is allocated to Organic FairTrade Fund. This Fund also receives contributions from other sources and provides loans to members wanting to convert to sustainable production, as well as other community benefits. Local cooperatives" funds (to organic and conventional members) taken from cooperatives" profits. Positive exogenous events Exogenous events having a positive impact on respondents" income i) increase in the paddy rice market price, ii) a positive shock on production, iii) present from farmers" sons and daughters (money or, in same cases, a car), v) wage shock in the second activity, vi) lottery winning and vii) granting of awards.)
Loans Saving Groups
Negative exogenous events Exogenous events having a negative impact on respondents" income (i) close relatives"s death, ii) desease, iii) car accidents, iv) fire, v) car breaking, an vi) increase in the input market price, vii) the death of animals used as capital investment (such as water buffalos), viii) a slow development of the soil.)
Distance from cooperatives Distance from cooperatives
Examples of the effect of the relationship between FT importers and producers
The first example concerns an event which occurred in 2000. At that time, although Green Net had developed its supply chain and packing system and had some quality control measures, there were problems with some of the packaged rice dispatched, to the point that an Italian FT organization (CTM)
rejected an entire container of rice. The FT importers, however, did not discontinue the relationship but sent experts to work with the cooperative. They looked at the milling and packing operations and helped develop a quality system which would fit with Green Net's conditions and capacity. Some time later, after the new system had been put in place, the FT importers again sent staff to help check on how the system was developing and working. Hence this was a key input to the development of Green Net's QA system.
A second example, which occurred in 2009, may aid understanding of how FT importers help the cooperative to cope with unexpected negative shocks. In that year the amount of milled rice yielded by the paddy was less than expected and below the amount committed for a number of containers of rice to FT partners. The problem was due to flooding during the harvest period of the previous year, which meant that the paddy could not cure properly. When the paddy was milled, it yielded broken rice which was not of export quality. The problem did not lead to a worsening or discontinuation of the FTcooperative relationship. On the contrary, FT importers are now studying whether they can help Green
Net with funds to help farmers prepare for and adapt to changing climatic conditions, and thereby obtain more consistent yields even though more irregular rain patterns may cause yield and quality problems for rice production.
The two farmer organisations studied
The Bak 
Robustness check: adding the "invisible" income from self consumption
All the estimates presented in Tables 3 and 5 Finally, The Davidson-McKinnon (1993) test confirms the superiority of the specification with FT affiliation versus that with organic certification years even when the invisible (self-consumed) part of agricultural production is consumed.
Instrumental Variable diagnostics.
The role of the tests now described may be better understood with the well-known smoking-health example. The observed correlation between smoking and health is not enough in principle to establish a causal nexus from the former to the latter. In fact, it may well be that third omitted factors drive both (or affect health in addition to smoking, thereby leading to overstatement of the effects of smoking on health independently from its indirect effect via affecting smoking decisions (Wooldridge, Sargan and Anderson and Rubin tests).
Wooldridge and Sargan test
Following the above example and more formally, the instrumental variable approach is required when regressors in a model are suspected of being correlated with the error term. This may occur either because of reverse causality (it is Y which causes X and not viceversa) or because of omission of a third variable driving the spurious correlation between X and Y). To overcome the problem it is necessary to find instrumental variables, that is, variables i) not included in the original regression; ii) correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, conditional on the other covariates; iii) uncorrelated with the error term in the original equation.
To test whether selected instruments possess the third property mentioned, the Wooldridge's (1995) heteroskedasticity-robust score test is used.
That is, given the instrument Z, the following estimate is performed
and then the base model [2] is estimated in which the residual of the previous equation is added as a regressor
The instrument is a proper one if the null hypothesis H 0 :α 2 =0 is not rejected.
The Sargan test (1958) is a test on the validity of instruments when more than one instrument is used for a single instrumented variable.
The hypothesis tested with the Sargan test is again that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to some set of residuals. If the null hypothesis is confirmed statistically (that is, not rejected), the instruments pass the test; they are valid by this criterion. Stock and Yogo (2005) propose useful tests with which to check for the relative weakness of the instruments in an IV regression framework. The null hypothesis consists of the weak identification of the TSLS estimator, in the sense that it is subject to bias that the investigator finds unacceptably large.
Stock and Yogo test
The test can be carried out in two ways: i) maximal relative bias and ii) maximal size. 
Anderson and Rubin test
Even when instruments are found to be weak, is it still possible to make inferences about the endogenous regressors. Anderson and Rubin (1949) propose a test of structural parameters (the AR test) that proves to be robust to weak instruments (i.e. the test has correct size in cases where instruments are weak, and when they are not).
The AR test is a Wald test that provides weak-instrument robust inference for testing the significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. This test is robust to the presence of weak instruments and is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of excluded instruments.
The test is equivalent to estimating the reduced form of the equation (with the full set of instruments as regressors) and testing that the coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero. Table 5 column 1 and Table 8 column 1, OLS Model # 2: Table 5 column 2 and Table 8 column 2, OLS Model # 3: Table 5 column 3 and Table 8 column 3, OLS Model # 4: Table 5 column 4 and Table 8 column 4, OLS Model # 5: Table 7 column 1 and Table 9 column 1, OLS Model # 6: Table 7 column 2 and Table 9 column 2, 2 SLS model # 1: Table 5 column 5 and Table 8 column 5, 2 SLS model # 2: Table 5 column 6 and Table 8 column 6, ** 1 percent significance, * 5 percent significance. Test legend: see Table 5 .*The value is calculated on the basis of the market prices measured at the time of the inquiry (the maintained assumption being that farmers would not alternatively have problems to sell the self consumed part on the market)
